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Abstract 
The fourteen elements of OSHA’s Process Safety Management (PSM) program underpin so much 
of facility operations. PSM programs grow in complexity over time and can become increasingly 
disembodied from the operational elements that form their robustness. Often new PSM programs 
are modeled from organically grown existing programs rather than tailored to the specific risks of 
the operation introducing more than necessary complexity from the beginning. Barrier-based 
approaches can revitalize an existing PSM program or serve as a platform to build a simplified 
PSM program. 
Bow ties reestablish direct connections to operations in a quickly visualized way transforming the 
perception of a PSM program from an operational albatross into an engagement tool to inspire 
ownership at all levels of the organization. This paper walks through each of the fourteen PSM 
elements highlighting the application and value of applying a barrier-based approach to the 
development or implementation of a PSM program.  
Whether working with a robust PSM program that has become more complex over time or building 
a simple program based on the broad PSM concepts, bow ties can help a company focus their 
efforts on efficiently addressing deficiencies in their management systems and managing their 
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API RP American Petroleum Institute Recommended Practice 
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CFR Code of Federal Regulations 
EI Energy Institute 
HAZOP Hazard and Operability 
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MAE Major Accident Events 
OSHA Occupation Safety and Health Administration 
PHA Process Hazards Analysis 
PSI Process Safety Information 









The fourteen elements of OSHA’s Process Safety Management (PSM) program underpin so much 
of facility operations. PSM programs grow in complexity over time and can become increasingly 
disembodied from the operational elements that form their robustness. Often new PSM programs 
are modeled from organically grown existing programs rather than tailored to the specific risks of 
the operation introducing more than necessary complexity from the beginning. Barrier-based 
approaches can revitalize an existing PSM program or serve as a platform to build a simplified 
PSM program. Bow ties are commonly used to communicate the major accident hazards at an 
onshore or offshore facility.  
Development of bow ties often follows the completion of a Process Hazards Analyses. Bow tie 
workshops use teams of experienced and knowledgeable people from various disciplines to 
develop the bow ties and select the barriers, previously identified in the PHAs, that meet the criteria 
for Major Accident Events (MAE) of being effective, independent, and auditable (Ref. /1/). 
The focus of this paper is to show how bow ties can be used in other ways to drive success in a 
company’s management system, regardless of where that company or facility may be in its process 
safety journey. This will be accomplished in the following ways: 
 Lay out a process for developing or updating a relevant process safety management system 
for both OSHA PSM covered and non-covered facilities by engaging personnel in various 
levels of a company.  
 Demonstrate how a bow tie can be used to develop or update a piece of the management 
system program associated with one of the 14 PSM elements. 
 Present examples of how to tap into the additional benefits of bow ties to engage employees 
and improve a company’s management system program. Examples are shown for some of 
the PSM elements. 
The approach presented in this paper will include use of bow ties at the corporate level as well as 
at the manufacturing facility level. The principles discussed in the Center for Chemical Process 
Safety’s (CCPS) Guidelines for Risk Based Process Safety (RBPS) are used in the development 
of this topic. 
Using Bow Ties to Develop or Update a Management System 
Bow ties can be used in developing a PSM program or updating an existing program for both 
OSHA PSM covered and non-covered facilities. The following benefits for using bow ties for PSM 
program development include: 
 Illustrating the barriers associated with MAEs. 
 Showing the impact of compromised degradation controls to barriers. 
 Engaging employees in barrier and degradation control quality 
 Encouraging employees’ appreciation for their role in identifying and maintaining barriers 
and degradation controls. 
Figure 1 shows how bow ties can be incorporated into the development or improvement of a 
management system program. This process is based on a company’s knowledge of the three factors 
discussed in CCPS’s Guidelines for RBPS specific to their company’s business (Ref. /2/): 
1. Identification of risks  
2. Level demand of process safety activity work compared to resources available. 
3. Existing process safety culture 
The steps are discussed further in this section. 
 
Figure 1 General Workflow for Bow Tie Application to PSM Program 
Step 1: Set the target. 
The target for a company’s PSM program will be determined by regulatory requirements. OSHA 
PSM requires that companies develop program management systems that address 14 elements. A 
company may further decide to use Guidelines for RBPS to determine what level of rigor is needed 
for each element of its management system. Facilities that are not covered by OSHA PSM, still 
choose to have management systems as a best practice, and may use a risk-based approach to build 
their management system program. 
 
 
Step 2: Identify and prioritize process safety risks. 
The next step is to sufficiently understand the risks, which is the first factor on which process 
safety practices are founded (Ref. /2/). Many companies use various PHA methodologies to 
identify and assess risks at their facilities with Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) studies being one 
of the common types used. Bow ties and Layers of Protection Analyses (LOPA) are often used to 
identify the effective, independent, reliable and auditable barriers. Bow tie workshops go one step 
further in that the Bow tie workshop team members identify the degradation factors1 and 
degradation controls2 needed for the barrier be available illustrated in Figure 2. Bow tie workshops 
are convenient settings to engage the same people, who are assigned to the upkeep of barriers, 
through the activity of identifying specific degradation controls for each barrier. 
 
Figure 2 Bow tie Diagram Showing Barriers along with Degradation Controls 
It is equally important for companies to identify process safety risks all levels of its operations 
including corporate and regional support levels. Bow tie diagrams can be useful for Corporate and 
Regional entities as well as manufacturing facilities. 
Step 3: Identify process safety activities using Bow ties. 
After identifying the risks and completing the bow tie workshops, the next factor to be addressed 
per RBPS Guidelines is the level of demand for process safety work activities needed compared 
to resources available (Ref. /2/). To determine the process safety activities, it is important to 
confirm that process safety practices associated with the degradation controls are in place. All 
process safety activities identified should be listed and linked to a management system element. 
                                                 
1
Degradation controls are measures which help prevent the degradation factor impairing the barrier. They lie on the 
pathway connecting the degradation threat to the main pathway barrier.  Degradation controls may not meet the full 
requirements for barrier validity (Ref. /1/). 
2 Degradation factor is a situation, condition, defect, or error that compromises the function of a main pathway barrier, 
through either defeating it or reducing its effectiveness. If a barrier degrades then the risks from the pathway on which 
it lies increase or escalate, hence the alternative name of escalation factor.  
 
This activity can be completed as part of the bow tie workshop or separately. The outcomes would 
include the following: 
 Short-term: A list of degradation control process safety activity gaps for existing barriers 
(e.g., missing PSI, out of date operating procedure, no maintenance procedure) and 
recommendation plan to address the gaps 
 Long-term: A list of process safety activities based on maintaining degradation controls 
 Time estimates for completing each process safety activity 
The outcome from such a workshop may look like that shown in Table 1 (following page). The 
information can then be used to calculate the process safety activity demand time associated with 
its respective management system element for all barrier degradation controls identified. Examples 
are shown in Figure 3, Figure 4, Figure 5, and Figure 6 (on the page following Table 1).  
Figure 3 shows the process safety activity demand currently associated with each management 
system element for the degradation controls. Figure 4 shows the additional process safety activity 
time needed to ensure the barrier degradation controls are in place long-term. Figure 5 shows 
projected long-term process safety activity demand time for the barrier degradation controls. Long-
term process safety activity time is the summation of the additional process safety activity demand 
time in addition to the existing process safety activity demand time. This will help a company see 
which management system elements need more resources long-term. 
Figure 6 is the time needed to implement the actions needed for the longer-term process safety 
activities. It helps prioritize resources short term. 
Step 4: Incorporate process safety culture findings. 
In addition to determining process safety activity and resource demand, is understanding the 
process safety culture (Ref. /2/), which may be accomplished through process safety culture 
assessments and review of leading, near miss and lagging indicators such as those discussed in 
API RP 754 Process Safety Performance Indicators for the Refining and Petrochemical Industries 
or CCPS’s Guidelines for Process Safety Metrics. 
Once process safety culture is understood across the organization, it is possible to determine how 




Table 1 Process Safety Activity Identification Outcome Worksheet 
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Figure 3 Current Process Safety Demand Time for 
Barrier Degradation Controls 
 
 
Figure 4 Additional Process Safety Demand 
Time for Barrier Degradation Controls 
 
 
Figure 5 Long-Term Process Safety Demand Time 
for Barrier Degradation Controls 
 
Figure 6 Short-Term Time for Action 
Implementation Time 
The roles of the responsible resources can be assigned to each degradation control and 
corresponding management system. It can also be possible to see how the emphasis of a person’s 
role can change with respect to management system elements.  
How much time a person’s role will change with respect to process safety activities vs. daily 
routine activities (if the breakdown of a resource’s role in there is known). This may help a 




















































Step 5: Prioritize PS activities 
Once the process safety activity demand and resource has been determined, the process safety 
culture rating can be used to help a company determine which process safety activities to focus on 
first with respect to their management system.  
Step 6: Develop Management system 
The findings from the facility level and corporate level assessments can be combined to an overall 
perspective of a company’s management system to see company-wide, systemic patterns with 
current and long-term process safe activities. 
Evergreen activities 
Bow ties, barriers and degradation controls should be reviewed periodically to determine where 
process safety activities should be modified and to change the resourcing as needed. Continuously 
monitor barrier degradation control integrity, ensuring procedures are up-to-date, inspections on 
barriers or degradation controls are not overdue and maintenance activities are being performed at 
designated intervals. If deficiencies are noted with lagging or even leading indicators, the process 
safety activity demands and resourcing availability should be reviewed. When changes are made 
to equipment and associated barriers, bowties should be modified. If bowties are modified, this 
could impact the process safety activity demands associated with the barrier’s degradation controls 
as well as the resources need to keep up the degradation controls.  
Consider periodically reviewing the management system using the review of bowties, barriers and 
degradation controls periodically to assure that the management system is addressing the current 
risks with optimal resources. 
Bow Ties to Design, Maintain and improve Management System Effectiveness 
Bow ties can be used at a high level to develop or update a piece of the management system 
program associated with one of the 14 PSM elements especially at the Corporate level as 
mentioned in Step 2 in the previous section.  
Once a company has determined the contents to be included or areas of improvement needed for 
the Employee Participation element of their management system, they can create a bow tie that 
can be reviewed periodically to determine areas of strengths and weaknesses. Figure 7 shows a 
bow ties that was developed using the contents of CCPS Guidelines for RBPS for Workforce 
Involvement (Ref. /2/). The Hazard is based on the attitude of the employees (i.e., their perception 
that their feedback does not matter and will not change safe work practices or safety culture). The 
top event is the result of the attitude which is “Lack of employee participation”, which is the 
opposite effect of what the management system element is aiming to achieve. The threats on the 
left-hand side are based on a breakdown or lack of key principles needed to implement an 
Employee Participation Program. These key principles are discussed in CCPS’s Guideline for 
RBPS (Ref. /2/). The preventive barriers are based on the possible work activities described for 
each of the key principles. To prevent breakdown of the preventive barriers, the degradation 
mechanisms for each barrier should be identified and controlled (Ref. /2/). 
Figure 8 shows the degradation factors (i.e., Inconsistent Implementation) and degradation 
controls (i.e., Owner of Employee Participation Element) associated the preventive barrier of 
“Consistent implementation” to prevent “Lack of dependable work practice” (Ref. /2/). It is worth 
 
 
noting that a bow tie like this can be created to assess the effectiveness of any company’s 
management system elements using the information in Guidelines for RBPS. In a workshop 
setting, senior management and workers validate the existence of the barriers, assess the 
effectiveness of those barriers, review selected metrics, and develop recommendations to improve 
the existing Employee Participation program. 
 




Figure 8 Bow Tie for Employee Participation Management System Element (with focus on 
Dependable Work Practice) (Ref. /2/) 
Various Applications of Bow Ties to Support OSHA PSM Elements  
Bowties can be used in other ways to engage employees in implementing the elements of a 
management system. This section shares some examples of how this can be accomplished. 
Employee Participation 
Bow ties can be used to monitor the success of an existing program in engaging the workforce at 
a high level as well as monitor the success of workforce involvement within each Management 
System Element. An example of an element-specific bow tie for Process Hazards with focus on 
employee participation is shown in Figure 10 (on the following page). Figure 10 shows the 
degradation factors and degradation controls associated with the preventive barrier of “PHA 
activities” and “Involvement of competent personnel” to prevent “Lack of dependable work 









Figure 10 Bow Tie for Employee Participation within Process Hazards Analysis Management System Element (with focus on 




Process Safety Information 
Established Process Safety (PSI) and relevant standards employed are required for covered 
processes in accordance with OSHA PSM 1910.119 (d). A bow tie can be an accountability tool 
for PSI and compliance with relevant standards associated with barriers. This type of information 
is referred to as barrier metadata in the joint publication by CCPS & Energy Institute on Bow Ties 
in Risk Management: A Concept Book. If PSI for a barrier or degradation control is missing, a 
barrier can be considered as not in place during the bow tie workshop. Therefore, the bow tie could 
be considered incomplete until the PSI is verified or acquired. It should be noted that the bow tie 
would be used as a mapping tool, not a repository for documents.   
Operating and Safe Work Procedures 
The employer must develop and implement written operating procedures, consistent with the 
process safety information, that provide clear instructions for safely conducting activities 
involved in each covered process in sections in accordance with OSHA PSM 1910.119 (f). 
OSHA PSM 1910.119 (k)) specifically focuses on the requirements for hot work. Procedures 
must be established to assure that there are no deficiencies in the barriers. The existing standard 
operating procedures and safe work procedures and relevant sections of the procedures can be 
documented in the bowtie. This shows the connection of the procedural steps to the bow tie to 
enforce the criticality of the procedure and specific sections or steps in preventing or reducing 
the likelihood of a major accident event. Procedures are shown as a degradation control. A poor 
or missing procedure can degrade a barrier. The use of bowtie for operating and safe work 
procedure is illustrated in Figure 11. The degradation control “Neighbouring firefighting units in 
remote areas” references the “Bridging Document” as necessary for the barrier “Active 
firefighting system” to be in place. 
 




OSHA 1910.119 (g) states that the implementation of an effective training program is one of the 
most important steps that an employer can take to enhance employee safety. Training programs 
with periodic refresher courses should be established to assure that there are no deficiencies in the 
barriers. The company can include the applicable bow tie barriers or degradation controls critical 
to an employee’s role or more specifically to a task or procedure. This is illustrated in Figure 11. 
The barrier “Active firefighting system” references “T.01 Task-specific ER training” as necessary 
for the barrier to be in place as an example, since personnel at the facility will need training to 
address a fire scenario. Additionally, the roles of personnel can be connected to barriers, also 
shown in Figure 11. The HSE Manager is assigned to the degradation control “Neighbouring 
firefighting units in remote areas”; it is the HSE Manager’s responsibility to assure that firefighting 
units can access the facility otherwise, the barrier “Active firefighting system” may not be in place 
during a fire. 
Contractors 
OSHA PSM 1910.119 (h) includes special provisions for contractors and their employees to 
emphasize the importance of everyone taking care that they do nothing to endanger those working 
nearby who may work for another employer. Contractors can be provided copies of the bow ties 
applicable to their area of work. The company can orient the contractor supervisors and employees 
on the bow ties and discuss how the successful execution of their activities is important to keeping 
the facility safe. 
Pre-Startup Safety Review 
OSHA PSM 1910.119 (i) requires the employer to perform a pre-startup safety review (PSSR) for 
new facilities and for modified facilities when the modification is significant enough to require a 
change in the process safety information. The bowties can be effective during PSSR review in the 
following ways: 
 illustrations to PSSR team members for importance of barriers in the process, 
 review of the outstanding PHA actions, especially those actions related to barriers that 
address risks with MAEs, and 
 assist in assigning priority to PSSR action items 
Mechanical Integrity 
Companies must maintain the mechanical integrity of critical process equipment to ensure it is 
designed and installed correctly and operates properly, per OSHA PSM 1910.119 (j). Mechanical 
integrity program must be established to assure that there are no deficiencies in the barriers, this is 
especially important with relief valves, SIS, and other safeguards. Bow ties can be used in the same 
way for tracking maintenance procedures and the associated roles of personnel as it can for the 
Operating Procedures by associating the maintenance and inspections procedures and roles of 
personnel to the applicable bow tie barriers and degradation controls. 
Management of Change 
OSHA states that changes to a process must be thoroughly evaluated to fully assess their impact 
on employee safety and health and to determine needed changes to operating procedures (1910.119 
(l)). When changes in the facility include barriers, the use of the bow tie can illustrate the impact 
 
 
of these changes to the barriers and its associated degradation controls. A barrier may need to be 
modified after an MOC review. It could be the case that the MOC procedure needs to be modified 
to ensure impacts on barrier effectiveness are adequately considered in the risk assessment. 
Incident Investigation  
OSHA requires the investigation of each incident that resulted or could have resulted in a 
catastrophic release of a highly hazardous chemical in the workplace (1910.119(m)). 
Barrier-based Systematic Cause Analysis Technique (BSCAT) is the use of a bow tie to map out 
the events based on failure of barriers during each part of the scenario. Root causes of barrier 
failures and near-miss barrier failures can be mapped to the related management system element 
to determine where there are deficiencies. BSCAT diagram is shown in Figure 12 (shown on the 
following page) for the Lac Mégantic train incident in Canada (2013). A close-up of the left-hand 
side is shown in Figure 13 (shown on the following page). The barrier “Locomotive Temporary 
Repair” between the Threat “Locomotive Fault (8 Months Before)” and Immediate Event 
“Locomotive starts to smoke badly on July 5” was not effective at that time in preventing the next 
immediate event since Management System Factor (MSF) “MSF10.1 Maintenance Program” did 
not address follow up of temporary repairs, in the example shown. In this case, there were systemic 
issues with Mechanical Integrity. 
Emergency Planning and Response 
OSHA requires emergency pre-planning and training to make employees aware of, and able to 
execute, proper actions (1910.119 (n)). For this reason, an emergency action plan for the entire 
plant must be developed and implemented in accordance with the provisions of other OSHA rules 
(29 CFR 1910.38(a)). Bow ties can be used as communication tools for onsite employees as well 
as municipal emergency responders to help all parties understand the MAEs and the importance 





 Figure 12 Illustration of BSCAT for Lac Mégantic Accident (Canada, 2013) (DNV GL) 
 






OSHA states that employers must make available all information necessary to comply with PSM 
to those employees who are responsible for compiling the process safety information, those 
developing the process hazard analysis, those responsible for developing the operating procedures, 
and those performing incident investigations, emergency planning and response, and compliance 
audits, without regard to the possible trade secret status of such information (1910.119(p)). The 
completed bow ties are a demonstration that relevant information is being shared. 
Conclusions 
Bow ties reestablish direct connections to operations in a quickly visualized way transforming the 
perception of a PSM program using an engagement tool that can inspire ownership at all levels of 
the organization. Bow ties can help a company focus their efforts on efficiently developing a 
management system, maintaining a management system and addressing deficiencies in their 
management systems to manage their most important risks. Bowties can be applied to the assure a 
management system covers the fourteen PSM elements in various ways.  
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